



Monetary Authority of Singapore Technology Risk Management Guidelines

Google Workspace Mapping

This document is designed to help financial institutions (“**regulated entity**”) supervised by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (“**MAS**”) to consider [Technology Risk Management Guidelines](#) (“**framework**”) in the context of Google Workspace and the Google Cloud Financial Services Contract.

We focus on Section 3 - Technology Risk Governance and Oversight, Section 4 - Technology Risk Management Framework, Section 5 - IT Project Management and Security-by-Design, Section 6 - Software Application Development and Management, Section 7 - IT Service Management, Section 8 - IT Resilience, Section 9 - Access Control, Section 10 - Cryptography, Section 11 - Data and Infrastructure Security, Section 12 - Cyber Security Operations, Section 13 - Cyber security Assessment, Section 14 - Online Financial Services, Section 15 - IT Audit and Annex A-C of the framework. For each paragraph, we provide commentary to help you understand how you can address the requirements using the Google Cloud services and the Google Cloud Services Contract.

#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
1	3 Technology Risk Governance and Oversight		
2	3.4 Management of Third Party Services		
3	3.4.2 The FI should assess and manage its exposure to technology risks that may affect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the IT systems and data at the third party before entering into a contractual agreement or partnership.	<p>Google provides comprehensive external documentation and whitepapers detailing our security infrastructure and operational model to help our customers perform their own risk assessment.</p> <p>Information about Google’s internal control environment and security history is available in Google’s certifications and audit reports. You can review Google’s current certifications and audit reports at any time.</p> <p>Information security measures</p> <p>The confidentiality and security of information when using a cloud service consists of two key elements:</p> <p><u>Google’s infrastructure</u></p> <p>Google manages the security of our infrastructure. This is the security of the hardware, software, networking and facilities that support the Services.</p> <p>Given the one-to-many nature of our service, Google provides the same robust security for all our customers.</p> <p>Google provides detailed information to customers about our security practices so that customers can understand them and consider them as part of their own risk analysis.</p> <p>More information is available at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our infrastructure security page • Our security whitepaper • Our cloud-native security whitepaper • Our infrastructure security design overview page • Our security resources page <p>In addition, you can review Google’s SOC 2 report.</p>	Data Security; Security Measures (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)



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		<p><u>Your data and applications in the cloud</u></p> <p>You define the security of your data and applications in the cloud. This refers to the security measures that you choose to implement and operate when you use the Services.</p> <p>(a) <u>Security by default</u></p> <p>Although we want to offer you as much choice as possible when it comes to your data, the security of your data is of paramount importance to Google and we take the following proactive steps to assist you:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Encryption at rest. Encryption at rest. Google encrypts certain data while it is stored at rest on a disk (including solid-state drives) or backup media. Even if an attacker or someone with physical access obtains the storage equipment containing your data, they won't be able to read it because they don't have the necessary encryption keys.• Encryption in transit. Google encrypts all data while it is "in transit"--traveling over the Internet and across the Google network between data centers. Should an attacker intercept such transmissions, they will only be able to capture encrypted data. at one or more network layers when data moves outside physical boundaries not controlled by Google or on behalf of Google. <p>See our Google Workspace encryption whitepaper for more information.</p> <p>(b) <u>Security products</u></p> <p>In addition to the other tools and practices available to you outside Google, you can choose to use tools provided by Google to enhance and monitor the security of your data. Information on Google's security products is available on our Cloud Security Products page.</p> <p>(c) <u>Security resources</u></p> <p>Google also publishes guidance on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Security best practices• Security use cases	Certifications and Audit Reports



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		<p>Google undergoes several independent third-party audits on at least an annual basis to provide independent verification of the effectiveness of our internal controls. To give you visibility of the effectiveness of our internal controls throughout our relationship, Google commits to maintain certifications / reports for the following key international standards during the term of our contract with you:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (Information Security Management Systems) • ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (Cloud Security) • ISO/IEC 27018:2014 (Cloud Privacy) • SOC 1 • SOC 2 • SOC 3 <p><u>Use of your information</u> Google commits to only access or use your data to provide the Services ordered by you and will not use it for any other Google products, services, or advertising.</p>	Protection of Customer Data
4	3.4.3 On an ongoing basis, the FI should ensure the third party employs a high standard of care and diligence in protecting data confidentiality and integrity as well as ensuring system resilience.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 3 for information on Google's information security practices.</p>	N/A
5	3.5 Competency and Background Review		
6	3.5.1 As the human element plays an important role in managing IT systems and processes in an IT environment, the FI should ensure personnel, including contractors and service providers, have the requisite level of competence and skills to perform the IT functions and manage technology risks.	<p><u>Company principals</u> Information about Google Cloud's leadership team is available on our Media Resources page.</p> <p><u>Background checks</u> Google conducts background checks on our employees where legally permissible to provide a safe environment for our customers and employees.</p>	N/A
7	3.5.2 Insider threat, which includes theft of confidential data, sabotage of IT systems and fraud by staff, contractors and service providers, is considered one of the risks to an organisation. A background check on personnel, who has access to the FI's data and IT systems, should be performed to minimise this risk.	Refer to Row 6 for more information.	N/A
8	3.6 Security Awareness and Training		
9	3.6.1 A comprehensive IT security awareness training programme should be established to maintain a high level of awareness among all staff in the FI. The content of the training programme should minimally include information on the prevailing cyber threat landscape and its implications, the FI's IT security policies and standards, as well as an individual's responsibility to safeguard information assets. All personnel in the FI should be made aware of the applicable laws, regulations, and guidelines pertaining to the use of, and access to, information assets.	Google provides documentation to explain how regulated entities and their employees can use our services. If a regulated entity would like more guided training, Google also provides a variety of courses and certifications .	N/A



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10	3.6.2 The training programme should be conducted at least annually for all staff, contractors and service providers who have access to the FI's information assets.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
11	3.6.3 The board of directors should undergo training to raise their awareness on risks associated with the use of technology and enhance their understanding of technology risk management practices.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
12	3.6.4 The training programme should be reviewed periodically to ensure its contents remain current and relevant. The review should take into consideration changes in the FI's IT security policies, prevalent and emerging risks, and the evolving cyber threat landscape.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
13	4 Technology Risk Management Framework		
14	4.1 Risk Management Framework		
15	4.1.1 The FI should establish a risk management framework to manage technology risks. Appropriate governance structures and processes should be established, with well defined roles, responsibilities, and clear reporting lines across the various organisational functions.	Google recognizes that you need to conduct due diligence and perform a risk assessment before deciding to use our services. To assist you, we've provided information for each of the areas you need to consider in the rows that follow.	N/A
16	4.1.2 Effective risk management practices and internal controls should be instituted to achieve data confidentiality and integrity, system security and reliability, as well as stability and resilience in its IT operating environment.	Google recognizes that institutions need to review our operations and internal controls for the services as part of their risk assessment. To assist, Google undergoes several independent third-party audits on at least an annual basis to provide independent verification of our operations and internal controls. Google commits to comply with the following key international standards during the term of our contract with you: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (Information Security Management Systems) • ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (Cloud Security) • ISO/IEC 27018:2014 (Cloud Privacy) • SOC 1 • SOC 2 • SOC 3 	Certifications and Audit Reports
17	4.1.3 The risk owner, who is accountable for ensuring proper risk treatment measures are implemented and enforced for a specific technology risk, should be identified. The role of the risk owner may be assumed by a function or group of functions within the FI, who is given the authority to manage technology risks.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
18	4.1.4 The framework should also encompass the following components:		
19	a. risk identification – identify threats and vulnerabilities to the FI and information assets;	Refer to Row 16 for more information.	N/A
20	a. risk assessment – assess the potential impact and likelihood of threats and vulnerabilities to the FI and information assets;	Refer to Row 16 for more information.	N/A



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21	a. risk treatment – implement processes and controls to manage technology risks posed to the FI and protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets; and	Refer to Row 16 for more information.	N/A
22	a. risk monitoring, review and reporting – monitor and review technology risks, which include risks that customers are exposed to, changes in business strategy, IT systems, environmental or operating conditions; and report key risks to the board of directors and senior management.	Refer to Row 16 for more information.	N/A
23	4.1.5 As business and IT environments, as well as the cyber threat landscape, tend to evolve over time, the FI should review the adequacy and effectiveness of its risk management framework regularly.	To assist you in your assessment, you may request to review Google’s audit reports via our Compliance reports manager page.	N/A
24	4.2 Risk Identification		
25	4.2.1 The FI should identify the threats and vulnerabilities applicable to its IT environment, including information assets that are maintained or supported by third party service providers. Examples of security threats that could have a severe impact on the FI and its stakeholders include internal sabotage, malware and data theft.	This is a customer consideration	N/A
26	4.3 Risk Assessment		
27	4.3.1 The FI should perform an analysis of the potential impact and consequences of the threats and vulnerabilities on the overall business and operations. The FI should take into consideration financial, operational, legal, reputational and regulatory factors in assessing technology risks.	This is a customer consideration	N/A
28	4.3.2 To facilitate the prioritisation of technology risks, a set of criteria measuring and determining the likelihood and impact of the risk scenarios should be established.	This is a customer consideration	N/A
29	4.4 Risk Treatment		
30	4.4.1 The FI should develop and implement risk mitigation and control measures that are consistent with the criticality of the information assets and the level of risk tolerance. The IT control and risk mitigation approach should be subject to regular review and update, taking into account the changing threat landscape and variations in the FI’s risk profile.	This is a customer consideration	N/A
31	4.4.2 As there are residual risks from threats and vulnerabilities which cannot be fully eliminated, the FI should assess whether risks have been reduced to an acceptable level after applying the mitigating measures. The criteria and approving authorities for risk acceptance should be clearly defined and it should be commensurate with the FI’s risk tolerance.	This is a customer consideration	N/A
32	4.4.3 The FI should take insurance cover for various insurable technology risks to reduce financial impact such as recovery and restitution costs.	This is a customer consideration	N/A
33	4.5 Risk Monitoring, Review and Reporting		



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34	4.5.1 The FI should institute a process for assessing and monitoring the design and operating effectiveness of IT controls against identified risks.	Refer to row 16 for more information.	N/A
35	4.5.2 A risk register should be maintained to facilitate the monitoring and reporting of technology risks. Significant risks should be monitored closely and reported to the board of directors and senior management. The frequency of monitoring and reporting should be commensurate with the level of risk.	Refer to row 16 for more information.	N/A
36	4.5.3 To facilitate risk reporting to management, technology risk metrics should be developed to highlight information assets that have the highest risk exposure. In determining the technology risk metrics, the FI should take into account risk events and audit observations, as well as applicable regulatory requirements.	Refer to row 16 for more information.	N/A
37	5 IT Project Management and Security-by-Design		
38	5.1 Project Management Framework		
39	5.1.1 A project management framework should be established to ensure consistency in project management practices, and delivery of outcomes that meets project objectives and requirements. The framework should cover the policies, standards, procedures, processes and activities to manage projects from initiation to closure.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
40	5.1.2 Detailed IT project plans should be established for all IT projects. An IT project plan should set out the scope of the project, as well as the activities, milestones and the deliverables to be realised at each phase of the project. The roles and responsibilities of staff involved in the project should be clearly defined in the plan.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
41	5.1.3 Key documentation in the IT project life cycle, including the feasibility analysis, cost-benefit analysis, business case analysis, project plan, as well as the implementation plan, should be maintained and approved by the relevant business and IT management.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
42	5.1.4 As project risks can adversely impact the IT project delivery timeline, budget and quality of the project deliverables, a risk management process should be established to identify, assess, treat and monitor the attendant risks throughout the project life cycle.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
43	5.2 Project Steering Committee		
44	5.2.1 For large and complex projects that impact the business, a project steering committee consisting of key stakeholders, including business owners and IT, should be formed to provide direction, guidance and oversight to ensure milestones are reached, and deliverables are realised in a timely manner.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
45	5.2.2 Risks and issues for large and complex projects, which cannot be resolved at the project management level, should be escalated to the project steering committee and senior management.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
46	5.3 System Acquisition		
47	5.3.1 The FI should establish standards and procedures for vendor evaluation and	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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	selection to ensure the selected vendor is qualified and able to meet its project requirements and deliverables. The level of assessment and due diligence performed should be commensurate with the criticality of the project deliverables to the FI.		
48	5.3.2 It is important that the FI assesses the robustness of the vendor's software development and quality assurance practices, and ensures stringent security practices are in place to safeguard and protect any sensitive data the vendor has access to over the course of the project. Any vendor access to the FI's IT systems should be controlled and monitored.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
49	5.3.3 If a project involves a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) solution that does not meet the FI's security requirements, the FI should assess the risks and ensure adequate mitigating controls are implemented to address the risks before the solution is deployed.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
50	5.3.4 The FI should assess if a source code escrow agreement should be in place, based on the criticality of the acquired software to the FI's business, so that the FI can have access to the source code in the event that the vendor is unable to support the FI. Suitable alternatives to replace the software should be identified if an escrow agreement could not be implemented.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
51	5.4 System Development Life Cycle and Security-By-Design		
52	5.4.1 The FI should establish a framework to manage its system development life cycle (SDLC). The framework should clearly define the processes, procedures and controls in each phase of the life cycle, such as initiation/planning, requirements analysis, design, implementation, testing and acceptance. Standards and procedures for the different phases of the SDLC should be maintained.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
53	5.4.2 The security-by-design approach refers to building security in every phase of the SDLC in order to minimise system vulnerabilities and reduce the attack surface. The FI should incorporate security specifications in the system design, perform continuous security evaluation, and adhere to security practices throughout the SDLC.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
54	5.4.3 Security requirements should minimally cover key control areas such as access control, authentication, authorisation, data integrity and confidentiality, system activity logging, security event tracking and exception handling.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
55	5.4.4 The SDLC should, where relevant, involve the IT security function in each phase of the life cycle.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
56	5.5 System Requirements Analysis		
57	5.5.1 The FI should identify, define and document the functional requirements for the IT system. In addition to functional requirements, key requirements such as system performance, resilience and security controls, should also be established and documented.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
58	5.5.2 In establishing the security requirements, the FI should assess the potential	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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	threats and risks related to the IT system, and determine the acceptable level of security required to meet its business needs.		
59	5.6 System Design and Implementation		
60	5.6.1 As part of the design phase, the FI should review the proposed architecture and design of the IT system, including the IT controls to be built into the system, to ensure they meet the defined requirements, before implementation.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
61	5.6.2 The FI should verify that system requirements are met by the current system design and implementation. Any changes to, or deviations from, the defined requirements should be endorsed by relevant stakeholders.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
62	5.6.3 Relevant domain experts should be engaged to participate in the design review. For example, the security design and architecture of the IT system should be reviewed by IT security specialists or qualified security consultants.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
63	5.7 System Testing and Acceptance		
64	5.7.1 A methodology for system testing should be established. The scope of testing should cover business logic, system function, security controls and system performance under various load and stress conditions. A test plan should be established and approved before testing.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
65	5.7.2 The FI should trace the requirements during the testing phase, and ensure each requirement is covered by appropriate test cases.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
66	5.7.3 The FI should maintain separate physical or logical environments for unit, system integration and user acceptance testing, and restrict access to each environment on a need-to basis.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
67	5.7.4 The FI should perform regression testing for changes (e.g. enhancement, rectification, etc.) to an existing IT system to validate that it continues to function properly after the changes have been implemented.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
68	5.7.5 Issues identified from testing, including system defects or software bugs, should be properly tracked and addressed. Major issues that could have an adverse impact on the FI's operations or delivery of service to customers should be reported to the project steering committee and addressed prior to deployment to the production environment.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
69	5.7.6 The FI should ensure the results of all testing that was conducted are documented in the test report, and signed off by the relevant stakeholders.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
70	5.8 Quality Management		
71	5.8.1 During project planning, the FI should define the expected quality attributes and the assessment metrics for the project deliverables based on its quality control standards.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
72	5.8.2 Quality assurance should be performed by an independent quality assurance	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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	function to ensure project activities and deliverables comply with the FI's policies, procedures and standards.		
73	6 Software Application Development and Management		
74	6.1 Secure Coding, Source Code Review and Application Security Testing		
75	6.1.1 Software bugs or vulnerabilities are typically targeted and exploited by threat actors to compromise an IT system, and they often occur because of poor software development practices. To minimise the bugs and vulnerabilities in its software, the FI should adopt standards on secure coding, source code review ⁸ and application security testing.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
76	6.1.2 The secure coding and source code review standards should cover areas such as secure programming practices, input validation, output encoding, access controls, authentication, cryptographic practices, and error and exception handling.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
77	6.1.3 A policy and procedure on the use of third party and open-source software codes should be established to ensure these codes are subject to review and testing before they are integrated into the FI's software.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
78	6.1.4 To facilitate the remediation of vulnerabilities in a timely manner, the FI should keep track of updates and reported vulnerabilities for third party and open-source software codes that are incorporated in the FI's software	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
79	6.1.5 The FI should ensure its software developers are trained or have the necessary knowledge and skills to apply the secure coding and application security standards when developing applications.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
80	6.1.6 It is essential for the FI to establish a comprehensive strategy to perform application security validation and testing. The FI may use a mixture of static, dynamic and interactive application security testing methods (refer to Annex A on Application Security Testing) to validate the security of the software application. The software validation and testing rules should be reviewed periodically and kept current.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
81	6.1.7 All issues and software defects discovered from the source code review and application security testing should be tracked. Major issues and software defects should be remediated before production deployment.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
82	6.2 Agile Software Development		
83	6.2.1 Agile software development is based on an iterative and incremental development model to accelerate software development and delivery to respond to business and customer needs. When adopting Agile software development methods, the FI should continue to incorporate the necessary SDLC and security-by-design principles throughout its Agile process.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
84	6.2.2 The FI should ensure secure coding, source code review and application security testing standards are applied during Agile software development.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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85	6.3 DevSecOps Management		
86	6.3.1 DevSecOps is the practice of automating and integrating IT operations, quality assurance and security practices in the software development process. It constitutes continuous integration, continuous delivery and IT security practices for frequent, efficient, reliable and secure development, testing and release of software products. The FI should ensure its DevSecOps activities and processes are aligned with its SDLC framework and IT service management processes (e.g. configuration management, change management, software release management).	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
87	6.3.2 The FI should implement adequate security measures and enforce segregation of duties for the software development, testing and release functions in its DevSecOps processes.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
88	6.4 Application Programming Interface Developments		
89	6.4.1 Application programming interfaces (APIs) enable various software applications to communicate and interact with each other and exchange data. Open APIs are publicly available APIs that provide developers with programmatic access to a software application or web service. FIs may collaborate with FinTech companies and develop open APIs, which are used by third parties to implement products and services for customers and the marketplace. Hence, it is important for the FI to establish adequate safeguards to manage the development and provisioning of APIs for secure delivery of such services.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
90	6.4.2 A well-defined vetting process should be implemented for assessing third parties' suitability in connecting to the FI via APIs, as well as governing third party API access. The vetting criteria should take into account factors such as the third party's nature of business, cyber security posture, industry reputation and track record.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
91	6.4.3 The FI should perform a risk assessment before allowing third parties to connect to its IT systems via APIs, and ensure the implementation for each API is commensurate with the sensitivity and business criticality of the data being exchanged, and the confidentiality and integrity requirements of the data.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
92	6.4.4 Security standards for designing and developing secure APIs should be established. The standards should include the measures to protect the API keys or access tokens, which are used to authorise access to APIs to exchange confidential data. A reasonable timeframe should be defined and enforced for access token expiry to reduce the risk of unauthorised access.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
93	6.4.5 Strong encryption standards and key management controls should be adopted to secure transmission of sensitive data through APIs.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
94	6.4.6 A robust security screening and testing of the API should be performed between the FI and its third parties before it is deployed into production. The FI should log the access sessions by third parties, such as the identity of the party making the API	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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	connections, date and time, as well as the data being accessed.		
95	6.4.7 Detective measures, such as technologies that provide real-time monitoring and alerting, should be instituted to provide visibility of the usage and performance of APIs, and detect suspicious activities. Robust measures should be established to promptly revoke the API keys or access token in the event of a breach.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
96	6.4.8 The FI should ensure adequate system capacity is in place to handle high volumes of API call requests, and implement measures to mitigate cyber threats such as denial of service (DoS) attacks.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
97	6.5 Management of End User Computing and Applications		
98	6.5.1 The prevalence of business application tools and software on the Internet has enabled end user computing, where business users develop or use simple applications to automate their operations, such as performing data analysis and generating reports. IT hardware, software and services that are not managed by the IT department (shadow IT) increase the FI's exposure to risks such as leakage of sensitive data or malware infection. Shadow IT should be managed as part of the FI's information assets.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
99	6.5.2 The FI should establish measures to control and monitor the use of shadow IT in its environment.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
100	6.5.3 A process should be established to assess the risk of end user developed or acquired applications to the FI, and ensure appropriate controls and security measures are implemented to address the identified risks, and approval is obtained before being used. The FI should ensure proper testing before the applications are deployed.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
101	7 IT Service Management		
102	7.1 IT Service Management Framework		
103	7.1.1 A robust IT service management framework is essential for supporting IT services and operations, tracking information assets, managing changes, responding to incidents, as well as ensuring the stability of the production IT environment. The framework should comprise the governance structure, processes and procedures for IT service management activities including configuration management, technology refresh management, patch management, change management, software release management, incident management and problem management.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
104	7.2 Configuration Management		
105	7.2.1 Configuration management is the process of maintaining key information (e.g. model, version, specifications, etc.) about the configuration of the hardware and software that makes up each IT system. The FI should implement a configuration management process to maintain accurate information of its hardware and software to have visibility and effective control of its IT systems.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
106	7.2.2 The FI should review and verify the configuration information of its hardware and	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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	software on a regular basis to ensure it is accurate and up-to-date.		
107	7.3 Technology Refresh Management		
108	7.3.1 The FI should avoid using outdated and unsupported hardware or software, which could increase its exposure to security and stability risks. The FI should closely monitor the hardware or software end-of-support (EOS) dates as service providers would typically cease the provision of patches, including those relating to security vulnerabilities that are found after the EOS date.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
109	7.3.2 A technology refresh plan for the replacement of hardware and software should be developed before they reach EOS. A risk assessment for hardware and software approaching EOS date should be conducted to evaluate the risks of their continued use, and effective risk mitigation measures should be implemented.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
110	7.3.3 The FI should obtain dispensation from its management for the continued use of outdated and unsupported hardware and software. The dispensation should be assigned a validity period that is commensurate with the identified risks and risk mitigation measures. The dispensation should be reviewed periodically to ensure the attendant risks remain at an acceptable level.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
111	7.4 Patch Management		
112	7.4.1 A patch management process should be established to ensure applicable functional and non-functional patches (e.g. fixes for security vulnerabilities and software bugs) are implemented within a timeframe that is commensurate with the criticality of the patches and the FI's IT systems.	This is a customer consideration. To assist you, refer to OS patch management Compute Engine Documentation for more information.	N/A
113	7.4.2 Patches should be tested before they are applied to the FI's IT systems in the production environment to ensure compatibility with existing IT systems or they do not introduce problems to the IT environment.	Refer to Row 112 for more information.	N/A
114	7.5 Change Management		
115	7.5.1 The FI should establish a change management process to ensure changes to information assets are assessed, tested, reviewed and approved before implementation.	Changes to Google Cloud are delivered as software releases. Change Management policies, including security code reviews and emergency fixes, are in place, and procedures for tracking, testing, approving, and validating changes are documented. Each service has a documented release process that specifies the procedures to be used, including definition of the scope of changes to be delivered, source code control, code review, building, testing, and record keeping. Google requires standard change management procedures to be applied during the design, development, deployment, and maintenance of all Google Applications, Systems, and Services.	N/A
116	7.5.2 A risk and impact analysis of the change to an information asset should be	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A



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	conducted before implementing the change. The analysis should cover factors such as security and implications of the change in relation to other information assets.		
117	7.5.3 The FI should ensure all changes are adequately tested in the test environment. Test plans for changes should be developed and approved by the relevant business and IT management. Test results should be accepted and signed off before the changes are deployed to the production environment.	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A
118	7.5.4 A change advisory board, comprising key stakeholders including business and IT management, should be formed to approve and prioritise the changes after considering the stability and security implications of the changes to the production environment.	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A
119	7.5.5 The FI should perform a backup of the information asset prior to the change implementation, and establish a rollback plan to revert the information asset to the previous state if a problem arises during or after the change implementation.	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A
120	7.5.6 Urgent or emergency changes, such as a high priority security patch for an IT system, are changes that need to be implemented expeditiously and may not be able to follow the standard change management process. To reduce the risk to the security and stability of the production environment, the FI should clearly define the procedures for assessing, approving and implementing emergency changes, as well as identify the authorisers or approvers for the changes.	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A
121	7.5.7 Logs contain useful information which facilitates investigations and troubleshooting. As such, the FI should ensure the logging facility is enabled to record activities that are performed during the change process.	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A
122	7.6 Software Release Management		
123	7.6.1 Segregation of duties in the software release process should be practised to ensure no single individual has the ability to develop, compile and move software codes from one environment to another.	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A
124	7.6.2 It is important that controls are implemented to maintain traceability and integrity for all software codes that are moved between IT environments.	Refer to row 115 for more information.	N/A
125	7.7 Incident Management		
126	7.7.1 An IT incident occurs when there is an unexpected disruption to the delivery of IT services or a security breach of an IT system, which compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of data or the IT system. The FI should establish an incident management framework with the objective of restoring an affected IT service or system to a secure and stable state, as quickly as possible, so as to minimise impact to the FI's business and customers.	<p><u>Incident Management</u> At Google, the on-site reliability team and customer support technicians are responsible for performing incident management services and also initiate, manage, respond to, and track incidents. The team is organized into weekly shifts and includes individuals designated as on-call personnel.</p> <p><u>Incident Escalation</u> Google has documented escalation procedures and communication protocols that address the handling of incidents and notifying appropriate individuals. Escalated</p>	N/A



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		<p>issues are treated with higher urgency and often shared with a wider audience. There are established roles and responsibilities for personnel tasked with incident management, including the identification, assignment, and managed remediation of incidents.</p> <p><u>Incident Resolution</u> After gathering the necessary information about the incident, the incident ticket is assigned to the appropriate support area based on the nature of the problem and/or the root cause. If the incident exists in another environment or is a recurring problem, the incident ticket is flagged for further investigation after resolution.</p>	
127	7.7.2 The FI should ensure sufficient resources are available to facilitate and support incident response and recovery. The FI may engage external assistance to augment its resources to facilitate and support incident response and recovery. For example, the FI can engage an incident response and security forensic company to support cyber attack investigation, and provide 24 by 7 incident response capability.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
128	7.7.3 The incident management framework should minimally cover:		
129	a. the process and procedure for handling IT incidents, including cyber related incidents;	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
130	a. maintenance and protection of supporting evidence for the investigation and diagnosis of incidents; and	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
131	a. the roles and responsibilities of staff and external parties involved in recording, analysis, escalation, decision-making, resolution and monitoring of incidents.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
132	7.7.4 The FI should configure system events or alerts to provide an early indication of issues that may affect its IT systems' performance and security. System events or alerts should be actively monitored so that prompt measures can be taken to address the issues early.	<p><u>Incident Alerts</u> At Google, Incident alerts are initiated whenever an incident occurs. Production monitoring tools, in response to an alert, automatically generate notifications to the incident management team when a monitored threshold is exceeded. A ticket may also be manually created by a Google employee when an issue is identified or in response to a customer service request.</p>	N/A
133	7.7.5 In some situations, a major incident may develop unfavourably into a crisis. The FI should regularly apprise its senior management of the status of major incidents so that decisions to mitigate the impact of the crisis can be made in a timely manner, such as activation of IT disaster recovery.	<p>Google will make information about developments that materially impact Google's ability to perform the Services in accordance with the SLAs available to you. More information is available on our Incidents & the Google Cloud dashboard page.</p> <p>In addition, Google will notify you of data incidents promptly and without undue delay. More information on Google's data incident response process is available in our Data incident response whitepaper.</p>	Significant Developments
134	7.7.6 A communications plan that covers the process and procedures to apprise customers of impact on services, and to handle media or public queries should be	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A



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	maintained. The plan should also include identifying the spokespersons and subject matter experts to address the media or public queries as well as the communication channels to disseminate information.		
135	7.7.7 It would be useful for the FI to provide timely updates to its customers on the progress of its incident management and the measures the FI is implementing to protect its customers and continue delivery of financial services. Where appropriate, the FI should advise its customers on actions that they should take to protect themselves.	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A
136	7.8.1 The FI should establish problem management process and procedures to determine and resolve the root cause of incidents to prevent the recurrence of similar incidents.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
137	7.8.2 The FI should maintain a record of past incidents which include lessons learnt to facilitate the diagnosis and resolution of future incidents with similar characteristics.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
138	7.8.3 A trend analysis of past incidents should be performed by the FI to identify commonalities and patterns in the incidents, and verify if the root causes to the problems had been properly identified and resolved. The FI should also use the analysis to determine if further corrective or preventive measures are necessary.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
139	8 IT Resilience		
140	8.1 System Availability		
141	8.1.1 Maintaining system availability is crucial in achieving confidence and trust in the FI's operational capabilities. IT systems should be designed and implemented to achieve the level of system availability that is commensurate with its business needs.	<p><u>Google Availability and Resilience</u> Google embeds redundancy as part of its architecture and failure is expected and corrected continuously. Google's highly redundant infrastructure also helps protect our customers from data loss. For more information, refer to our Architecture Framework.</p> <p>Google Cloud services are available in locations across North America, South America, Europe, Asia, and Australia. These locations are divided into regions and zones. You can choose where to locate your applications to meet your latency, availability, and durability requirements. Refer to our whitepaper on Infrastructure design for availability and resilience for more details.</p> <p>The SLAs contain Google's commitments regarding availability of the Services. They are available on the Google Workspace Service Level Agreements page.</p> <p>Google's IP data network allows us to deliver highly available and low latency services across the globe. In the event of network failure, data is automatically shifted from one facility to another so that Google Workspace customers can continue working in most cases without interruption. Customers with global workforces can collaborate on documents, video conferencing and more without additional configuration or expense. Global teams share a highly performant and low latency experience as they work together on a single global network.</p>	Services



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142	8.1.2 Redundancy or fault-tolerant solutions should be implemented for IT systems which require high system availability. The FI should perform a periodic review of its IT system and network architecture design to identify weaknesses in the existing design. The review should include a mapping of internal and external dependencies of the FI's IT systems to determine any single point of failure. It is important that the FI conducts regular testing to ascertain that the level of resilience continues to meet its business requirements.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 141 for more information.</p>	N/A
143	8.1.3 The FI should continuously monitor the utilisation of its system resources against a set of pre-defined thresholds. Such monitoring could facilitate the FI in carrying out capacity management to ensure IT resources are adequate to meet current and future business needs.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 141 for more information.</p>	N/A
144	8.1.4 Procedures should be established to respond to situations when pre-defined thresholds for system resources and system performance have been breached.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>You can monitor Google's performance of the Services (including the SLAs) on a regular basis using the functionality of the Services.</p> <p>For example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Status Dashboard provides status information on the Services. Access Transparency is a feature that enables you to review logs of actions taken by Google personnel regarding your data. Log entries include: the affected resource, the time of action, the reason for the action (e.g. the case number associated with the support request); and data about who is acting on data (e.g. the Google personnel's location). Admin Console Reports allow you to examine potential security risks, measure user collaboration, track who signs in and when, analyze administrator activity, and much more. <p>Refer to Row 141 for more information.</p>	Ongoing Performance Monitoring
145	8.2 System Recoverability		
146	8.2.1 The FI should establish systems' recovery time objectives (RTO) and recovery point objectives (RPO) that are aligned to its business resumption and system recovery priorities.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google will implement a disaster recovery and/or business continuity plan for the Services, review and test it at least annually and ensure it remains current with industry standards. Regulated entities can review our plan and testing results.</p> <p>In addition, information about how customers can use our Services in their own business contingency planning is available in our Disaster Recovery Planning Guide. In particular, refer to the Architecting disaster recovery for cloud infrastructure outages</p>	N/A



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		article for information about how you can achieve your desired RTO and RPO for your applications.	
147	8.2.2 The FI's disaster recovery plan should include procedures to recover systems from various disaster scenarios, as well as the roles and responsibilities of relevant personnel in the recovery process. The disaster recovery plan should be reviewed at least annually and updated when there are material changes to business operations, information assets or environmental factors.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google will implement a disaster recovery and business contingency plan for our services, review and test it at least annually and ensure it remains current with industry standards. Regulated entities can review our plan and testing results.</p> <p>In addition, information about how customers can use our Services in their own disaster recovery and business contingency planning is available in our Disaster Recovery Planning Guide.</p> <p>In particular, as part of your contingency planning, you can choose to use Anthos to build, deploy and optimize your applications in both cloud and on-premises environments. Anthos provides a platform to develop, secure and manage applications across hybrid and multi-cloud environments.</p>	Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery
148	8.2.3 During the recovery process, the FI should follow the established disaster recovery plan that has been tested and approved by management. The FI should avoid deviating from the plan as untested recovery measures could exacerbate the incident and prolong the recovery process. In exceptional circumstances where untested recovery measures need to be used, the FI should perform a risk assessment and ensure adequate controls are in place, as well as obtain approval from senior management.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 147 for information on Google's ability to provide disaster recovery and business continuity.</p>	N/A
149	8.2.4 The FI should endeavour to operate from its recovery, secondary or alternate site periodically so as to have the assurance that its infrastructure and systems at these sites are able to support business needs for an extended period of time when production systems failover from the primary or production site.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 147 for information on Google's ability to provide disaster recovery and business continuity.</p>	N/A
150	8.3 Testing of Disaster Recovery Plan		
151	8.3.1 The FI should perform regular testing of its disaster recovery plan to validate the effectiveness of the plan and ensure its systems are able to meet the defined recovery objectives. Relevant stakeholders, including those in business and IT functions, should participate in the disaster recovery test to familiarise themselves with the recovery processes and ascertain if the systems are performing as expected.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 147 for information on Google's ability to provide disaster recovery and business continuity.</p>	N/A
152	8.3.2 A disaster recovery test plan should include the test objectives and scope, test scenarios, test scripts with details of the activities to be performed during and after testing, system recovery procedures, and the criteria for measuring the success of the test.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 147 for information on Google's ability to provide disaster recovery and business continuity.</p>	N/A
153	8.3.3 The testing of disaster recovery plan should comprise: (a) various plausible disruption scenarios, including full and partial incapacitation of the primary or production site and major system failures; and	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p>	N/A



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	(b) recovery dependencies between information assets, including those managed by third parties.	Refer to Row 147 for information on Google's ability to provide disaster recovery and business continuity.	
154	8.3.4 Where information assets are managed by service providers, the FI should assess the service provider's disaster recovery capability and ensure disaster recovery arrangements for these information assets are established, tested and verified to meet its business needs. The FI should engage its service provider to test the recovery steps that require coordinated actions between the service provider and the FI.	Refer to Row 147 for information on Google's ability to provide disaster recovery and business continuity.	N/A
155	8.4 System Backup and Recovery		
156	8.4.1 The FI should establish a system and data backup strategy, and develop a plan to perform regular backups so that systems and data can be recovered in the event of a system disruption or when data is corrupted or deleted.	This is a customer consideration. Regulated entities can use Cloud Storage as part of their backup routine. Refer to our Disaster Recovery Building Blocks and Disaster Recovery Scenarios for Data articles for more information about how you can use the services for data backup.	N/A
157	8.4.2 To ensure data availability is aligned with the FI's business requirements, the FI should institute a policy to manage the backup data life cycle, which includes the establishment of the frequency of data backup and data retention period, management of data storage mechanisms, and secure destruction of backup data.	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Row 156 for further information on how you can use Google's services for data backup.	N/A
158	8.4.3 The FI should periodically test the restoration of its system and data backups to validate the effectiveness of its backup restoration procedures.	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Row 156 for further information on how you can use Google's services for data backup.	N/A
159	8.4.4 To protect data in backup from unauthorised access and modification, the FI should ensure any confidential data stored in the backup media is secured (e.g. encrypted). Backup media should be stored offline or at an offsite location.	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Row 156 for further information on how you can use Google's services for data backup.	N/A
160	8.5 Data Centre Resilience		
161	8.5.1 The FI should conduct a Threat and Vulnerability Risk Assessment (TVRA) for its data centres(DCs) to identify potential vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and the protection that should be established to safeguard the DCs against physical and environmental threats. In addition, the TVRA should consider the political and economic climate of the country in which the DCs are located. The TVRA should be reviewed whenever there is a significant change in the threat landscape or when there is a material change in the DC's environment.	This is a customer consideration. This is addressed in the Cloud Data Processing Addendum where Google makes commitments to protect your data, including regarding data center and network security and data security. Google anticipates physical threats to its data centers and has implemented countermeasures to prevent or limit the impact from these threats. Additional resources: a) Section 6.1 of Google Workspace Cloud Data Processing Addendum describes the security measures that Google will implement and maintain	N/A



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
		<p>b) Google Workspace Security White Paper for details on our data center security</p> <p>c) Information on Data Center Security Data and Security – Data Centers – Google</p>	
162	<p>8.5.2 The FI should ensure adequate redundancy for the power, network connectivity, and cooling, electrical and mechanical systems of the DC to eliminate any single point of failure. Consideration should be given to the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) diversification of data communications and network paths; (b) deployment of power equipment, such as uninterruptible power sources, backup diesel generators with fuel tanks; and (c) implementation of redundant cooling equipment (e.g. cooling towers, chilled water supply and computer room air conditioning units) to control the temperature and humidity levels in the DC and prevent fluctuations potentially harmful to systems. 	<p>Google embeds redundancy as part of its architecture and failure is expected and corrected continuously. Google's highly redundant infrastructure also helps protect our customers from data loss.</p> <p>To keep things running 24/7 and ensure uninterrupted services, Google's data centers feature redundant power systems and environmental controls. Every critical component has a primary and alternate power source, each with equal power. Diesel engine backup generators can provide enough emergency electrical power to run each data center at full capacity. Cooling systems maintain a constant operating temperature for servers and other hardware, reducing the risk of service outages. Fire detection and suppression equipment helps prevent damage to hardware. Heat, fire, and smoke detectors trigger audible and visible alarms in the affected zone, at security operations consoles, and at remote monitoring desks.</p> <p>Refer to Data and Security – Data Centers – Google for more information.</p>	N/A
163	8.5.3 As part of the DC's environmental controls, the FI should implement fire detection and suppression devices or systems, such as smoke or heat detectors, inert gas suppression systems, and wet or dry sprinkler systems.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 162 for more information.</p>	N/A
164	8.5.4 The FI's secondary or disaster recovery DC should be geographically separated from its primary or production DC so that both sites will not be impacted by a disruption to the underlying infrastructure (e.g. telecommunications and power) in a particular location.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
165	8.5.5 The DC's physical security and environmental controls should be monitored on a 24 by 7 basis. Appropriate escalation, response plans and procedures for physical and environmental incidents at DCs should be established and tested	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 161 and Row 162 for more information.</p>	N/A
166	<p>8.5.6 The DC should have adequate physical access controls including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) access granted to staff should be on a need-to-have basis, and revoked promptly if access is no longer required; (b) proper notification and approval for visitors to the DC. All visitors should be escorted by authorised staff at all times while in the DC; (c) physical access points in the DC should be secured and monitored at all times; (d) access to equipment racks should be restricted to authorised staff and monitored; (e) access to keys and other physical access devices should be restricted to authorised staff, and replaced or changed promptly if they have been misplaced, lost or stolen; and 	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google Data centers maintain secure external perimeter protections. All data centers employ electronic card key access control systems that are linked to a system alarm. Access to perimeter doors, shipping and receiving, and other critical areas is logged, including unauthorized activity. Failed access attempts are logged by the access control system and investigated as appropriate. Authorized access throughout the business operations and data centers is restricted based on an individual's job responsibilities. The fire doors at the data centers are alarmed and can only be opened from the inside. CCTV cameras are in operation both inside and outside the data centers. The positioning of the cameras has been designed to help cover strategic areas including, among others, the perimeter, doors to the data center building, and shipping/receiving.</p>	N/A



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	(f) segregation of delivery and common areas from security sensitive areas should be enforced.	Security operations personnel manage the CCTV monitoring, recording and control equipment. Cameras record on site via digital video recorders 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Refer to Data and Security – Data Centers – Google for more information.	
167	9 Access Control		
168	9.1 User Access Management		
169	9.1.1 The principles of 'never alone', 'segregation of duties', and 'least privilege' should be applied when granting staff access to information assets so that no one person has access to perform sensitive system functions. Access rights and system privileges should be granted according to the roles and responsibilities of the staff, contractors and service providers.	This is addressed in the Cloud Data Processing Addendum where Google makes commitments to protect your data, including regarding access control and privilege management. For Google employees, access rights and levels are based on their job function and role, using the concepts of least-privilege and need-to-know to match access privileges to defined responsibilities. Google employees are only granted a limited set of default permissions to access company resources, such as employee email and Google's internal employee portal. Requests for additional access follow a formal process that involves a request and an approval from a data or system owner, manager, or other executives, as dictated by Google's security policies. Approvals are managed by workflow tools that maintain audit records of all changes.	Data Security (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)
170	9.1.2 The FI should establish a user access management process to provision, change and revoke access rights to information assets. Access rights should be authorised and approved by appropriate parties, such as the information asset owner.	This is a customer consideration. Google takes appropriate measures to manage accounts with BeyondCorp . BeyondCorp is used by most Googlers every day to provide user- and device-based authentication and authorization for Google's core infrastructure and corporate resources. BeyondCorp is Google's implementation of the zero trust model. It builds upon a decade of experience at Google, combined with ideas and best practices from the community. By shifting access controls from the network perimeter to individual users, BeyondCorp enables secure work from virtually any location without the need for a traditional VPN. Google provides our customers with tools and services to manage their user access management. Cloud Identity and Access Management helps to prevent against unauthorized access by controlling access rights and roles for Google Cloud resources. Refer to Row 169 for more information.	N/A
171	9.1.3 For proper accountability, the FI should ensure records of user access and user management activities are uniquely identified and logged for audit and investigation purposes.	This is a customer consideration. Google's internal data access processes and policies are designed to prevent unauthorized persons and/or systems from gaining access to systems used to process your data.	Access and Site Controls (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)



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		<p>Regulated entities can operate the services independently without action by Google personnel. Although Google personnel manage and maintain the hardware, software, networking and facilities that support the services, given the one-to-many nature of the services, there are no Google personnel dedicated to delivering the services to an individual customer.</p> <p>You can also monitor and control the limited actions performed by Google personnel on your data using these tools:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access Transparency is a feature that enables you to review logs of actions taken by Google personnel regarding your data. Log entries include: the affected resource, the time of action, the reason for the action (e.g. the case number associated with the support request); and data about who is acting on data (e.g. the Google personnel's location). • Access Approval is a feature that enables you to require your explicit approval before Google support and engineering teams are permitted access to your customer content. Access Approval provides an additional layer of control on top of the transparency provided by Access Transparency. <p>Information about Google's internal control environment, security history and audit coverage is available in Google's certifications and audit reports. You can review Google's current certifications and audit reports at any time.</p>	
172	9.1.4 The FI should establish a password policy and a process to enforce strong password controls for users' access to IT systems.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google native authentication requires a minimum 8 character complex password. Tenants can set the maximum or increase the minimum. A built-in Password Monitor is visible to the end user upon password creation and to the System Administrators of the tenant who can decide to force a password change on any user that is later detected to have a password that is weak. Google's native authentication has protections in place that would detect a brute force attack and challenge the user to solve a Captcha and would auto lock the account if suspicious activity is detected. The tenant's System Administrators can reset that account for the end user.</p>	Data Security; Security Measures (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)
173	9.1.5 Multi-factor authentication should be implemented for users with access to sensitive system functions to safeguard the systems and data from unauthorised access.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google maintains policies and procedures that enforce data access permissions. Two factor authentication is required for all employee access to all company and customer resources. Google provides (under NDA) customers with a SOC 2 report that includes testing of Google's access controls.</p>	Data Security; Security Measures (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)



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		<p>Customers are responsible for implementing and operating multi-factor authentication measures used to determine and ensure the security of their data and applications in the cloud.</p> <p>Additionally, Google cloud provides customers the capability to enable MFA. Customers can protect their user accounts and company data with a wide variety of MFA verification methods such as push notifications, Google Authenticator, phishing-resistant Titan Security Keys, and using your Android or iOS device as a security key. Refer here for more information.</p>	
174	9.1.6 The FI should ensure appropriate parties such as information asset owners perform periodic user access review to verify the appropriateness of privileges that are granted to users. The user access review should be used to identify dormant and redundant user accounts, as well as inappropriate access rights. Exceptions noted from the user access review should be resolved as soon as practicable.	<p>This is a customer consideration. Customers should perform their own periodic reviews to ensure accuracy.</p> <p>Google maintains assets inventories and assigns ownership for managing its critical resources based on role and responsibility. Google performs internal user access reviews for critical infrastructure systems.</p> <p>Refer to Row 219 for further information.</p>	Data Security (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)
175	9.1.7 Users should only be granted access rights on a need-to-use basis. Access rights that are no longer needed, as a result of a change in a user's job responsibilities or employment status (e.g. transfer or termination of employment), should be revoked or disabled promptly.	Refer to Row 169 for more information.	N/A
176	9.1.8 The FI should subject its service providers, who are given access to the FI's information assets, to the same monitoring and access restrictions on the FI's personnel.	Refer to Row 171 for more information on Access Management.	N/A
177	9.2 Privileged Access Management		
178	9.2.1 Users granted privileged system access have the ability to inflict severe damage on the stability and security of the FI's IT environment. Access to privileged accounts should only be granted on a need-to-use basis; activities of these accounts should be logged and reviewed as part of the FI's ongoing monitoring.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google restricts access based on need-to-know and job function.</p> <p>Googler access is monitored and audited by our dedicated security, privacy, and internal audit teams, and we provide audit logs to customers through Access Transparency for Google Workspace.</p>	N/A
179	9.2.2 System and service accounts are used by operating systems, applications and databases to interact or access other systems' resources. The FI should establish a process to manage and monitor the use of system and service accounts for suspicious or unauthorised activities.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>In addition to the other tools and practices available to you outside Google, you can choose to use tools provided by Google to enhance and monitor the security of your data. Information on Google's security products is available here.</p>	N/A



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		Cloud Identity is a unified identity, access, app, and endpoint management (IAM/EMM) platform that helps IT and security teams maximize end-user efficiency and protect your organization's data.	
180	9.3 Remote Access Management		
181	9.3.1 Remote access allows users to connect to the FI's internal network via an external network to access the FI's data and systems, such as emails and business applications. Remote connections should be encrypted to prevent data leakage through network sniffing and eavesdropping. Strong authentication, such as multi-factor authentication, should be implemented for users performing remote access to safeguard against unauthorised access to the FI's IT environment.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Being on the corporate LAN is not our primary mechanism for granting access privileges. We instead use application-level access management controls which allow us to expose internal applications to only specific users when they are coming from a correctly managed device and from expected networks and geographic locations.</p> <p>For more detail see our additional reading about 'BeyondCorp'. Also refer to Row 47 for more information around multi-factor authentication services.</p>	N/A
182	9.3.2 The FI should ensure remote access to the FI's information assets is only allowed from devices that have been secured according to the FI's security standards.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 181 for more information.</p> <p>Google offers our customers Endpoint Management services to assist with remote access on various devices.</p>	N/A
183	10 Cryptography		
184	10.1 Cryptographic Algorithm and Protocol		
185	10.1.1 The primary applications of cryptography are to protect data confidentiality, and maintain data integrity and authenticity. For example, cryptography is used in data encryption to protect sensitive data; cryptographic digital signatures can be used to verify the authenticity of the data origin and check if the data has been altered. Besides these applications, cryptography is also commonly used in authentication protocols.	<p>At Google, we take the following proactive steps to assist you:</p> <p>Encryption at rest. Google encrypts customer data stored at rest by default, with no additional action required from you. More information is available at: Encryption at rest in Google Cloud.</p> <p>Encryption in transit. Google encrypts and authenticates all data in transit at one or more network layers when data moves outside physical boundaries not controlled by Google or on behalf of Google.</p> <p>Google uses encryption in transit to protect your data being intercepted while data moves between your site and the cloud provider or between two services.</p> <p>This protection is achieved by encrypting the data before transmission; authenticating the endpoints; and decrypting and verifying the data on arrival. For example, Transport Layer Security (TLS) is often used to encrypt data in transit for transport security, and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) is used often for email message security. More information is available at: Encryption at transit in Google</p>	Data Security; Security Measures (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)



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		<p>Cloud.</p> <p>In addition, Google offers tools you can choose to use these encryption and key management tools:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cloud KMS is a cloud-hosted key management service that lets you manage cryptographic keys for your cloud services the same way you do on-premises. • Cloud HSM lets you protect Cloud KMS encryption keys and perform cryptographic operations within a managed hardware security module. You can generate, use, rotate, and destroy various symmetric and asymmetric keys. • See using Cloud KMS with other products to understand which products are supported with the service, i.e. Cloud SQL. Google also publishes articles such as Exploring container security: Use your own keys to protect your data on GKE to provide further guidance to customers for securing their solutions. • Google Cloud Key Management (beta) lets you protect data at rest using encryption keys that are stored and managed in a third-party key management system that's deployed outside Google's infrastructure. The service currently supports BigQuery and Compute Engine. See use third-party keys in the cloud with Cloud External Key Manager. • Key Access Justification (alpha) works with External Key Manager. It provides a detailed justification each time one of your keys is requested to decrypt data, along with a mechanism for you to explicitly approve or deny providing the key using an automated policy that you set. See Key Access Justifications: a new level of control and visibility. 	
186	10.1.2 The FI should adopt cryptographic algorithms from well-established international standards. The FI should also select an appropriate algorithm and encryption key length that meet its security objectives and requirements.	Refer to Key purposes and algorithms Cloud KMS Documentation for more information around cryptographic algorithms available to our customers.	N/A
187	10.1.3 Where the security of the cryptographic algorithm depends on the unpredictability of a random seed or number, the FI should ensure the seed or random number is of sufficient length and randomness.	Refer to row 186 for more information.	N/A
188	10.1.4 The FI should ensure all cryptographic algorithms used have been subject to rigorous testing or vetting to meet the identified security objectives and requirements.	Refer to row 186 for more information.	N/A
189	10.1.5 The FI should monitor developments in the area of cryptanalysis and, where necessary, update or change the cryptographic algorithms or increase the key lengths to ensure they remain resilient against evolving threats.	Refer to row 186 for more information.	N/A
190	10.2 Cryptographic Key Management		



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
191	10.2.1 Cryptographic key management policy, standards and procedures covering key generation, distribution, installation, renewal, revocation, recovery and expiry should be established.	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Google Cloud Key Management Service Documentation for more information.	N/A
192	10.2.2 The FI should ensure cryptographic keys are securely generated and protected from unauthorised disclosure. Any cryptographic key or sensitive data used to generate or derive the keys should also be protected or securely destroyed after the key is generated.	Refer to row 191 for more information around ways to securely generate, protect, and destroy cryptographic keys on Google cloud.	N/A
193	10.2.3 The FI should determine the appropriate lifespan of each cryptographic key based on factors, such as the sensitivity of the data, the criticality of the system to be protected, and the threats and risks that the data or system may be exposed to. The cryptographic key should be securely replaced, before it expires at the end of its lifespan.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
194	10.2.4 To protect sensitive cryptographic keys, the FI should manage, process and store such keys in hardened and tamper resistant systems, e.g. by using a hardware security module.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
195	10.2.5 Where sensitive cryptographic keys need to be transmitted, the FI should ensure these keys are not exposed during transmission. The keys should be distributed to the intended recipient via an out-of-band channel or other secure means to minimise the risk of interception.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
196	10.2.6 Diversification of cryptographic keys can limit the impact of key exposure. Cryptographic keys should be used for a single purpose. For instance, the cryptographic key for data encryption should be different from the one that is used to generate cryptographic digital signatures.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
197	10.2.7 If a cryptographic key is found to be compromised, the FI should revoke and replace the key and all other keys whose security could also be compromised as a result of the exposed key.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
198	10.2.8 When cryptographic keys have expired or have been revoked, the FI should use a secure key destruction method to ensure the keys are not recoverable.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
199	10.2.9 When replacing or renewing a compromised or expiring cryptographic key, the FI should generate the new key in a manner such that any adversary who has knowledge of part or whole of the previous key will not be able to derive the new key from it.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
200	10.2.10 Cryptographic keys can be corrupted or unintentionally deleted. As such, the FI should maintain backups of cryptographic keys for recovery purposes and accord them a high level of protection.	Refer to row 191 more for information.	N/A
201	11 Data and Infrastructure Security		
202	11.1.1 The FI should develop comprehensive data loss prevention policies and adopt measures to detect and prevent unauthorised access, modification, copying, or transmission of its confidential data, taking into consideration the following:	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Row 3 for more information on data security and confidentiality.	N/A



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
	<p>(a) data in motion - data that traverses a network or that is transported between sites;</p> <p>(b) data at rest - data in endpoint devices such as notebooks, personal computers, portable storage devices and mobile devices, as well as data in systems such as files stored on servers, databases, backup media and storage platforms (e.g. cloud); and</p> <p>(c) data in use - data that is being used or processed by a system.</p>	<p>Additionally, Google offers Cloud data loss prevention (DLP) services to our customers to help you discover, classify, and protect your most sensitive data.</p> <p>Google offers our customers Endpoint Management services to assist with remote access on various devices.</p> <p>Furthermore, we take the following proactive steps to assist with ensuring confidentiality of your data:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Encryption at rest. Google encrypts customer data stored at rest by default, with no additional action required from you. More information is available at: Encryption at rest. • Encryption in transit. Google encrypts and authenticates all data in transit at one or more network layers when data moves outside physical boundaries not controlled by Google or on behalf of Google. More information is available at Encryption in transit. 	
203	11.1.2 The FI should implement appropriate measures to prevent and detect data theft, as well as unauthorised modification in systems and endpoint devices. The FI should ensure systems managed by the FI's service providers are accorded the same level of protection and subject to the same security standards.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 3 for more information on data security and confidentiality.</p>	N/A
204	11.1.3 Systems and endpoint devices are often targeted by cyber criminals to gain access or exfiltrate confidential data within an organisation. As such, confidential data stored in systems and endpoint devices should be encrypted and protected by strong access controls.	<p>Google uses encryption in transit to protect your data if communications are intercepted while data moves between your site and the cloud provider or between two services. This protection is achieved by encrypting the data before transmission; authenticating the endpoints; and decrypting and verifying the data on arrival. For example, Transport Layer Security (TLS) is often used to encrypt data in transit for transport security, and Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) is used often for email message security.</p>	Data Security; Security Measures (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)
205	11.1.4 The FI should ensure only authorised data storage media, systems and endpoint devices are used to communicate, transfer, or store confidential data.	Refer to Row 3 for more information on data security and confidentiality.	N/A
206	11.1.5 Security measures should be implemented to prevent and detect the use of unauthorised internet services which allow users to communicate or store confidential data. Examples of such services include social media, cloud storage and file sharing, emails, and messaging applications.	Refer to Row 3 for more information on data security and confidentiality.	N/A
207	11.1.6 The use of sensitive production data in non-production environments should be restricted. In exceptional situations where such data needs to be used in non-production environments, proper approval has to be obtained from senior management. The FI should ensure appropriate controls are implemented in non-production environments to	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 3 for more information on data security and confidentiality.</p>	N/A



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
	manage the access and removal of such data to prevent data leakage. Where possible, such data should be masked in the non-production environments.		
208	11.1.7 The FI should ensure confidential data is irrevocably deleted from storage media, systems and endpoint devices before they are disposed of or redeployed.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google has strict policies and procedures to govern the management of the equipment lifecycle within its production data centers. Any disk that did, at any point in its lifecycle, contain customer data is subject to a series of data destruction processes before leaving Google's premises, and would need to be authorized by the appropriate operations manager before release. For more information, please see: Remove corporate data from a device - Google Workspace Admin Help. See also the Decommissioned disks and disk erase policy in the Cloud Data Processing Addendum.</p>	Appendix 2: Security measures; (Cloud Data Processing Addendum)
209	11.2 Network Security		
210	11.2.1 The FI should install network security devices such as firewalls to secure the network between the FI and the Internet, as well as connections with third parties.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google manages the security of our infrastructure. This is the security of the hardware, software, networking and facilities that support the Services.</p> <p>Given the one-to-many nature of our service, Google provides the same robust security for all our customers.</p> <p>Google provides detailed information to customers about our security practices so that customers can understand them and consider them as part of their own risk analysis.</p> <p>More information is available at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our infrastructure security page • Our security whitepaper • Our cloud-native security whitepaper • Our infrastructure security design overview page • Our security resources page <p>Google has implemented network and host based tools to detect and respond to potential security incidents.</p> <p>Intrusion detection is intended to provide insight into ongoing attack activities and provide adequate information to respond to incidents. Google's intrusion detection involves:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Tightly controlling the size and make-up of Google's attack surface through preventative measures; 2. Employing intelligent detection controls at data entry points; and 	N/A



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		<p>3. Employing technologies that automatically remedy certain dangerous situations.</p> <p>Please review Google Infrastructure Security Design Overview Solutions regarding defense-in-depth techniques deployed across our infrastructure.</p>	
211	11.2.2 To minimise the risk of cyber threats, such as lateral movement and insider threat, the FI should deploy effective security mechanisms to protect information assets. Information assets could be grouped into network segments based on the criticality of systems, the system's functional role (e.g. database and application) or the sensitivity of the data.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 3 for more information on Google's information security measures.</p> <p>Google maintains assets inventories and assigns ownership for managing its critical resources.</p>	N/A
212	11.2.3 Network intrusion prevention systems should be deployed in the FI's network to detect and block malicious network traffic.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 210 for more information on network security.</p>	N/A
213	11.2.4 The FI should implement network access controls to detect and prevent unauthorised devices from connecting to its network.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 210 for more information on network security.</p>	N/A
214	11.2.5 Network access control rules in network devices such as firewalls, routers, switches and access points should be reviewed on a regular basis to ensure they are kept up-to-date. Obsolete rules and insecure network protocols should be removed promptly as these can be exploited to gain unauthorised access to the FI's network and systems.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 210 for more information on network security.</p>	N/A
215	11.2.6 Internet web browsing provides a conduit for cyber criminals to access the FI's IT systems. In this regard, the FI should consider isolating internet web browsing activities from its endpoint devices through the use of physical or logical controls, or implement equivalent controls, so as to reduce exposure of its IT systems to cyber attacks.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 3 for information on Google's information security measures.</p>	N/A
216	11.2.7 An effective DoS protection should be implemented to detect and respond to various types of DoS attacks. The FI could engage DoS mitigation service providers to filter potential DoS traffic before it reaches the FI's network infrastructure.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 210 for more information on network security.</p>	N/A
217	11.2.8 A review of the FI's network architecture, including the network security design, as well as system and network interconnections, should be conducted on a periodic basis to identify potential cyber security vulnerabilities.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 210 for more information on network security.</p>	N/A
218	11.3 System Security		
219	11.3.1 The security standards for the FI's hardware and software (e.g. operating systems, databases, network devices and endpoint devices) should outline the configurations that will minimise their exposure to cyber threats. The standards should be reviewed periodically for relevance and effectiveness.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google recognizes that you expect independent verification of our security, privacy and compliance controls. To assist, Google undergoes several independent third-party audits on at least an annual basis to provide independent verification of our operations and</p>	Certifications and Audit Reports



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
		<p>internal controls. Google commits to comply with the following key international standards during the term of our contract with you:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (Information Security Management Systems) • ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (Cloud Security) • ISO/IEC 27018:2014 (Cloud Privacy) • SOC 1 • SOC 2 • SOC 3 <p>Google's audit scope covers Services, infrastructure systems, policies and procedures, common processes and personnel. As part of Google's routine planning, scoping, and readiness activities, recurring key systems and controls, as well as new systems and controls, are reviewed prior to the audit work commencing.</p> <p>You can review Google's current certifications and audit reports at any time.</p>	
220	11.3.2 The FI should establish a process to verify that the standards are applied uniformly on systems and to identify deviations from the standards. Risks arising from deviations should be addressed in a timely manner.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to 219 for information on the system security standards that Google complies with.</p>	N/A
221	11.3.3 Endpoint protection, which includes but is not limited to behavioural-based and signature-based solutions, should be implemented to protect the FI from malware infection and address common delivery channels of malware, such as malicious links, websites, email attachments or infected removable storage media.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>An effective malware attack can lead to account compromise, data theft, and possibly additional access to a network. Google takes these threats to its networks and its customers very seriously and uses a variety of methods to prevent, detect and eradicate malware.</p> <p>Google operates VirusTotal, a free online service that analyzes files and URLs enabling the identification of viruses, worms, trojans and other kinds of malicious content detected by antivirus engines and website scanners. VirusTotal's mission is to help in improving the antivirus and security industry and make the Internet a safer place through the development of free tools and services.</p> <p>Google makes use of multiple antivirus engines in Gmail, Drive, servers and workstations to help identify malware that may be missed by antivirus signatures.</p>	N/A
222	11.3.4 The FI should ensure that anti-malware signatures are kept up-to-date and the systems are regularly scanned for malicious files or anomalous activities.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Refer to Row 221 for more information.</p>	N/A



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
223	11.3.5 To facilitate early detection and prompt remediation of suspicious or malicious systems activities, the FI should implement detection and response mechanisms to perform scanning of indicators of compromise (IOCs) in a timely manner, and proactively monitor systems', including endpoint systems', processes for anomalies and suspicious activities.	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Row 221 for more information.	N/A
224	11.3.6 Security measures, such as application white-listing, should be implemented to ensure only authorised software is allowed to be installed on the FI's systems.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
225	11.3.7 When implementing Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), the FI should conduct a comprehensive risk assessment and implement appropriate measures to secure its BYOD environment before allowing staff to use their personal devices to access the corporate network. Refer to Annex B on the security measures for BYOD.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
226	11.4 Virtualisation Security		
227	11.4.1 Virtualisation is used by organisations to optimise the use of computing resources and to enhance resilience. The technology allows several virtual machines (VMs) that support different business applications to be hosted on a physical system. A system failure or security breach in one of the VMs could have contagion impact on other VMs. The FI should ensure security standards are established for all components of a virtualisation solution.	Refer to row 3 for more information around Google's approach to security.	N/A
228	11.4.2 Strong access controls should be implemented to restrict administrative access to the hypervisor and host operating system as both control the guest operating systems and other components in the virtual environment.	Refer to row 3 for more information around Google's approach to security.	N/A
229	11.4.3 The FI should establish policies and standards to manage virtual images and snapshots. The standards should include details that govern the security, creation, distribution, storage, use, retirement and destruction of virtual images and snapshots so as to protect these assets against unauthorised access or modification.	Refer to row 3 for more information around Google's approach to security.	N/A
230	11.5 Internet of Things		
231	11.5.1 Internet of Things (IoT) includes any electronic devices, such as smartphones, multi-function printers, security cameras and smart televisions, which can be connected to the FI's network or the Internet. As with all information assets, the FI should maintain an inventory of all its IoT devices, including information such as the networks which they are connected to and their physical locations.	This is a customer consideration. Google offers our customers IoT Core as a fully managed service that allows you to easily and securely connect, manage, and ingest data from millions of globally dispersed devices. Cloud IoT Core, in combination with other services on the Cloud IoT platform, provides a complete solution for collecting, processing, analyzing, and visualizing IoT data in real time to support improved operational efficiency.	N/A
232	11.5.2 Many IoT devices are designed without or with minimal security controls. If compromised, these devices can be commandeered and used to gain unauthorised access to the FI's network and systems or as a launch pad for cyber attacks on the FI. The FI should assess and implement processes and controls to mitigate risks arising from IoT.	Refer to row 231 for more information.	N/A



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233	11.5.3 The network that hosts IoT devices should be secured. For instance, network access controls can be implemented to restrict network traffic to and from an IoT device to prevent a cyber threat actor from accessing the FI's network and launching malware or DoS attacks. To further reduce IoT risks, the FI should host IoT devices in a separate network segment from the network that hosts the FI's systems and confidential data.	Refer to row 231 for more information.	N/A
234	11.5.4 The FI should implement controls to prevent unauthorised access to IoT devices.	Refer to row 231 for more information.	N/A
235	11.5.5 Similar to other systems, the FI should monitor IoT devices for suspicious or anomalous system activities so that prompt actions can be taken to isolate compromised devices.	Refer to row 231 for more information.	N/A
236	12 Cyber Security Operations		
237	12.1 Cyber Threat Intelligence and Information Sharing		
238	12.1.1 To maintain good cyber situational awareness, the FI should establish a process to collect, process and analyse cyber-related information for its relevance and potential impact to the FI's business and IT environment. Cyber-related information would include cyber events, cyber threat intelligence and information on system vulnerabilities.	Refer to row 3 for more information around Google's approach to cyber security.	N/A
239	12.1.2 The FI should procure cyber intelligence monitoring services. As cyber threat information sharing is an important component of cyber resilience within the financial ecosystem, the FI should actively participate in cyber threat information-sharing arrangements with trusted parties to share and receive timely and actionable cyber threat information.	Refer to row 3 for more information around Google's approach to cyber security.	N/A
240	12.1.3 At the same time, the FI should establish a process to detect and respond to misinformation related to the FI that are propagated via the Internet. The FI should consider engaging external media monitoring services to facilitate the evaluation and identification of online misinformation.	Refer to row 3 for more information around Google's approach to cyber security.	N/A
241	12.2 Cyber Event Monitoring and Detection		
242	12.2.1 To facilitate continuous monitoring and analysis of cyber events; as well as prompt detection and response to cyber incidents, the FI should establish a security operations centre or acquire managed security services. The processes, roles and responsibilities for security operations should be defined.	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A
243	12.2.2 A process to collect, process, review and retain system logs should be established to facilitate the FI's security monitoring operations. These logs should be protected against unauthorised access.	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A
244	12.2.3 To facilitate identification of anomalies, the FI should establish a baseline profile of each IT system's routine activities and analyse the system activities against the baseline profiles. The profiles should be regularly reviewed and updated.	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A
245	12.2.4 The FI should consider applying user behavioural analytics to enhance the effectiveness of security monitoring. User behavioural analytics might include the use of	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
	machine learning algorithms in real time to analyse system logs, establish a baseline of normal user activities and identify suspicious or anomalous behaviours.		
246	12.2.5 Correlation of multiple events registered on system logs should be performed to identify suspicious or anomalous system activity patterns.	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A
247	12.2.6 A process should be established to ensure timely escalation to relevant stakeholders regarding suspicious or anomalous system activities or user behaviour	Refer to row 133 for more information.	N/A
248	12.3 Cyber Incident Response and Management		
249	12.3.1 The FI should establish a cyber incident response and management plan to swiftly isolate and neutralise a cyber threat and to securely resume affected services. The plan should describe communication, coordination and response procedures to address plausible cyber threat scenarios.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
250	12.3.2 As part of the plan, the FI should establish a process to investigate and identify the security or control deficiencies that resulted in the security breach. The investigation should also evaluate the full extent of the impact to the FI.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
251	12.3.3 Information from cyber intelligence and lessons learnt from cyber incidents should be used to enhance the existing controls or improve the cyber incident management plan.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
252	13 Cyber Security Assessment		
253	13.1 Vulnerability Assessment		
254	13.1.1 The FI should establish a process to conduct regular vulnerability assessment (VA) on their IT systems to identify security vulnerabilities and ensure risk arising from these gaps are addressed in a timely manner. The frequency of VA should be commensurate with the criticality of the IT system and the security risk to which it is exposed.	<p>This is a customer consideration.</p> <p>Google administers a vulnerability management process that actively scans for security threats using a combination of commercially available and purpose-built in-house tools, intensive automated and manual penetration efforts, quality assurance processes, software security reviews and external audits.</p> <p>Google's vulnerability management team is responsible for tracking and following up on vulnerabilities. Once a vulnerability requiring remediation has been identified, it is logged, prioritized according to severity, and assigned an owner. The vulnerability management team tracks such issues and follows up frequently until they can verify that the issues have been remediated.</p> <p>More information is available at:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Our infrastructure security page • Our security whitepaper • Our cloud-native security whitepaper • Our infrastructure security design overview page 	N/A



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		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Our security resources page Refer to our security whitepaper on security monitoring and vulnerability management.	
255	13.1.2 When performing VA, the scope should minimally include vulnerability discovery, identification of weak security configurations, and open network ports, as well as application vulnerabilities. For web-based systems, the scope of VA should include checks on common web-based vulnerabilities.	Refer to Row 254 for more information on vulnerability assessment.	N/A
256	13.2 Penetration Testing		
257	13.2.1 The FI should carry out penetration testing (PT) to obtain an in-depth evaluation of its cyber security defences. A combination of blackbox and greybox testing should be conducted for online financial services.	This is a customer consideration. You can perform penetration testing of the services with Google. In addition, Google engages a qualified and independent third party to conduct penetration testing of the Services. More information is available here .	Customer Penetration Testing
258	13.2.2 A bug bounty programme is another means by which an FI could discover vulnerabilities in their IT systems by inviting and incentivising ethical or “white hat” hackers to conduct PT on their systems. The FI may consider conducting a bug bounty programme to test the security of its IT infrastructure to complement its PT.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
259	13.2.3 To obtain a more accurate assessment of the robustness of the FI’s security measures, PT should be conducted in the production environment. Proper safeguards should be implemented when PT is conducted in the production environment.	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Row 257 for more information on customer penetration testing.	N/A
260	13.2.4 The frequency of PT should be determined based on factors such as system criticality and the system’s exposure to cyber risks. For systems that are directly accessible from the Internet, the FI is expected to conduct PT to validate the adequacy of the security controls at least once annually or whenever these systems undergo major changes or updates.	This is a customer consideration. Refer to Row 257 for more information on customer penetration testing.	N/A
261	13.3 Cyber Exercises		
262	13.3.1 The FI should carry out regular scenario-based cyber exercises to validate its response and recovery, as well as communication plans against cyber threats. These exercises could include social engineering, table-top, or cyber range exercises.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
263	13.3.2 Depending on the exercise objectives, the FI should involve relevant stakeholders, including senior management, business functions, corporate communications, crisis management team, service providers, and technical staff responsible for cyber threat detection, response and recovery.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
264	13.4 Adversarial Attack Simulation Exercise		



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#	Framework reference	Google Workspace commentary	Google Cloud Services Contract reference
265	13.4.1 The FI should perform an adversarial attack simulation exercise to test and validate the effectiveness of its cyber defence and response plan against prevalent cyber threats.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
266	13.4.2 The objectives, scope and rules of engagement should be defined before the commencement of the exercise, and the exercise should be conducted in a controlled manner under close supervision to ensure the activities carried out by the red team ³³ do not disrupt the FI's production systems.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
267	13.5 Intelligence-Based Scenario Design		
268	13.5.1 To simulate realistic adversarial attacks during any cyber security assessment, the threat scenario should be designed and based on challenging but plausible cyber threats.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
269	13.5.2 The FI could also design the exercise scenario by using threat intelligence that is relevant to their IT environment to identify threat actors who are most likely to pose a threat to the FI; and identify the tactics, techniques and procedures most likely to be used in such attacks.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
270	13.6 Remediation Management		
271	13.6.1 A comprehensive remediation process should be established to track and resolve issues identified from the cyber security assessments or exercises. The process should minimally include the following:	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
272	a. severity assessment and classification of an issue;	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
273	b. timeframe to remediate issues of different severity; and	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
274	c. risk assessment and mitigation strategies to manage deviations from the framework.	Refer to row 126 for more information.	N/A
275	14 Online Financial Services		
276	14.1 Security of Online Financial Services		
277	14.1.1 Online financial services include banking, trading, insurance, or other financial and payment services that are provisioned via the Internet. In delivering online financial services, the FI should implement security and control measures which are commensurate with the risk involved to ensure the security of data and online services.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
278	14.1.2 The FI should secure its communications channels to protect customer data. This can be achieved through data encryption and digital signatures.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
279	14.1.3 Adequate measures should also be taken to minimise exposure of the FI's online financial services to common attack vectors such as code injection attack, cross-site scripting, man-in-the-middle attack (MITMA), domain name system (DNS) hijacking, distributed denial of service (DDoS), malware and spoofing attacks.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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280	14.1.4 An FI offering online financial services access via a mobile device should be aware of the risks unique to mobile applications. Specific measures aimed at addressing the risks of mobile applications should be put in place. Refer to Annex C for guidance on Mobile Application Security.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
281	14.1.5 The FI should only make available mobile applications or software to customers through official mobile application stores, or other secure delivery channels.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
282	14.1.6 The FI should actively monitor for phishing campaigns targeting the FI and its customers. Immediate action should be taken to report phishing attempts to service providers to facilitate the removal of malicious content. The FI should alert its customers of such campaigns and advise them of security measures to adopt to protect against phishing.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
283	14.1.7 Rooted or jailbroken mobile devices, which are more susceptible to malware and may have more security vulnerabilities, should be disallowed from accessing the FI's mobile applications to perform financial transactions unless the application has been secured within a sandbox or container that insulates the application from tampering and interception by malware.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
284	14.2 Customer Authentication and Transaction Signing		
285	14.2.1 Multi-factor authentication should be deployed at login for online financial services to secure the customer authentication process. Multi-factor authentication can be based on two or more of the following factors, i.e. what you know (e.g. personal identification number or password), what you have (e.g. one-time password (OTP) generator) and who you are (e.g. biometrics).	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
286	14.2.2 End-to-end encryption should be implemented for the transmission of customer passwords so that they are not exposed at any intermediate nodes between the customer mobile application or browser and the IT system where passwords are verified. To safeguard the confidentiality of customer passwords, the passwords should only be verified in a hardened or tamper resistant system.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
287	14.2.3 The FI should implement transaction-signing (e.g. digital signatures) for authorising high-risk activities to protect the integrity of customer accounts' data and transaction details. High-risk activities include changes to sensitive customer data (e.g. customer office and home address, email and telephone contact details), registration of third party payee details, high value funds transfers and revision of funds transfer limits.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
288	14.2.4 Besides login and transaction-signing for high-risk activities, the FI may implement appropriate risk-based or adaptive authentication that presents customers with authentication options that are commensurate with the risk level of the transaction and sensitivity of the data.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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289	14.2.5 When implementing time-based OTPs, the FI should establish a validity period that is as short as practicable to lower the risk of a stolen OTP being used for fraudulent transactions.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
290	14.2.6 Where biometric technologies and customer passwords are used for customer authentication, the FI should ensure the biometrics-related data and authentication credentials are encrypted in storage and during transmission.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
291	14.2.7 The performance of the biometric solution, based on false acceptance rate(FAR) and false rejection rate (FRR), should be calibrated to be commensurate with the risk associated with the online activity.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
292	14.2.8 A soft token is a software-based two-factor authentication mechanism installed on a general-purpose device. Appropriate measures, such as verifying the identity of the customer, detecting and blocking rooted or jailbroken devices, and performing device binding, should be implemented during soft token provisioning.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
293	14.2.9 The FI should ensure the authenticated session, together with its encryption protocol, remains intact throughout the interaction with the customer. Measures to detect and terminate hijacked sessions should be implemented. To reduce the risk of an attacker from maintaining a hijacked session indefinitely, an online session should be automatically terminated after inactivity for a predefined time.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
294	14.2.10 Where alternate controls and processes (e.g. maker-checker function) are implemented for corporate or institutional customers to authorise transactions, the FI should perform a security risk assessment of controls or processes to ensure they are commensurate with the risk of the activities that are being carried out.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
295	14.2.11 To safeguard the confidentiality of authentication credentials, such as biometric templates and passwords, the FI should store these credentials in a form that is resistant to reverse engineering. A process and procedure should also be implemented to revoke and replace authentication credentials and mechanisms that have been compromised.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
296	14.3 Fraud Monitoring		
297	14.3.1 The FI should implement real-time fraud monitoring systems to identify and block suspicious or fraudulent online transactions.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
298	14.3.2 A process should be established to investigate suspicious transactions or payments and to ensure issues are adequately and promptly addressed.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
299	14.3.3 The FI should notify customers of suspicious activities or funds transfers above a threshold that is defined by the FI or customers. The notification should contain meaningful information such as type of transaction and payment amount, as well as instructions to report suspicious activities or unauthorised transactions.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
300	14.4 Customer Education and Communication		



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301	14.4.1 Customers should be informed of the security best practices that they should adopt when using online financial services. This includes the measures to take to secure their electronic devices that are used to access online financial services.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
302	14.4.2 The FI should alert its customers on a timely basis to new cyber threats so that they can take precautionary measures.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
303	14.4.3 The FI should advise their customers on the means to detect unauthorised transactions and to report promptly security issues, suspicious activities or suspected fraud to the FI.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
304	15 IT Audit		
305	15.1 Audit Function		
306	15.1.1 Audit plays an important role to assess the effectiveness of the controls, risk management and governance process in the FI. The FI should ensure IT audit is performed to provide the board of directors and senior management an independent and objective opinion of the adequacy and effectiveness of the FI's risk management, governance and internal controls relative to its existing and emerging technology risks.	Google recognizes that regulated entities must be able to audit our services effectively. Google grants audit, access and information rights to regulated entities and supervisory authorities, and both their appointees. Regulated entities may access their data on the services at any time and may provide their supervisory authority with access.	Regulator Information, Audit and Access Customer Information, Audit and Access
307	15.1.2 A comprehensive set of auditable areas for technology risk should be identified so that an effective risk assessment could be performed during audit planning. Auditable areas should include all IT operations, functions and processes.	Refer to row 306 for more information around Google's auditable areas.	N/A
308	15.1.3 The frequency of IT audits should be commensurate with the criticality of and risk posed by the IT information asset, function or process.	Google recognizes that you expect independent verification of our security, privacy and compliance controls. Google undergoes several independent third-party audits on a regular basis to provide this assurance. Google commits to comply with the following key international standards during the term of our contract with you: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISO/IEC 27001:2013 (Information Security Management Systems) • ISO/IEC 27017:2015 (Cloud Security) • ISO/IEC 27018:2014 (Cloud Privacy) • SOC 1 • SOC 2 • SOC 3 You can review Google's current certifications and audit reports at any time.	N/A
309	15.1.4 The FI should ensure its IT auditors have the requisite level of competency and skills to effectively assess and evaluate the adequacy of IT policies, procedures, processes and controls implemented.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
310	Annex A: Application Security Testing		
311	A.1 Application security testing aims to identify and remediate exploitable loopholes and weaknesses in software applications that could result in data leakage, disruption to	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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	business operations, financial losses and reputational damage. A good application security testing practice requires proactive security assurance techniques to be built into the various phases of the SDLC.		
312	A.2 Common testing methods for identifying security vulnerabilities in software applications include:		
313	a. Static Application Security Testing: Static Application Security Testing (SAST) involves a set of tools or technologies designed to scan and analyse static source codes, byte codes and binaries for coding and design flaws indicative of security vulnerabilities. The tester will have full internal knowledge of the IT system including architecture and design specifications, source codes or configuration files to guide the testing.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
314	b. Dynamic Application Security Testing: Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) involves a set of tools or technologies designed to detect conditions indicative of exploitable vulnerabilities in an IT system in its run-time state. The tester has limited or no prior knowledge of the system when the test is performed.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
315	c. Interactive Application Security Testing: Interactive Application Security Testing (IAST) involves a combination of SAST and DAST techniques to analyse application codes, run-time controls libraries, requests and responses, as well as data and control flows and identify vulnerabilities in an IT system.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
316	d. Fuzzing or Fuzz Testing: Fuzzing is an automated software testing technique used to discover coding errors and bugs by inputting random data, known as fuzz, to the IT system. This could be included as part of DAST or IAST.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
317	Annex B: BYOD Security		
318	B.1 The FI should implement data loss prevention measures on personal computing or mobile devices that are used to access the FI's information assets. Two common ways to address BYOD security are the use of mobile device or application management, as well as virtualisation solutions. These solutions can be augmented with other security measures for personal devices to provide enhanced functionalities:		
319	a. Mobile Device or Application Management: Mobile Device Management (MDM) solutions are used to manage and control mobile devices used to access the FI's resources while Mobile Application Management (MAM) are used to manage and control the access at the application. Before a personal device or application is permitted to access the FI's network, the device is verified to ensure it has not been "jailbroken", "rooted" or compromised. MDM and MAM solutions usually come with storage encryption, "lock and wipe" capabilities, enforced authentication policies and can be used in conjunction with other security measures.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A



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320	b. Virtualisation: Virtualisation allows staff to have on-demand access to enterprise computing resources and data from their personal devices. Strict security policies should be enabled within the virtual environment to restrict copying and use of peripheral devices, such as printers and removable attached storage, to prevent data leakage.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
321	Annex C: Mobile Application Security		
322	C.1 Security measures that should be considered for securing mobile applications are as follows:		
323	a. avoid storing or caching data in the mobile application to mitigate the risk of data compromise on the device. Data should be stored in a protected and trusted area of the mobile device;	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
324	b. protect private cryptographic keys;	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
325	c. implement anti-hooking or anti-tampering mechanisms to prevent injection of malicious code that could alter or monitor the behaviour of the application at runtime;	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
326	d. implement appropriate application integrity check (e.g. using checksum and digital signature) to verify the authenticity and integrity of the application and code obfuscation techniques to prevent reverse engineering of the mobile application;	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
327	e. implement certificate or public key pinning to protect against MITMA;	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
328	f. implement a secure in-app keypad to mitigate against malware that captures keystrokes; and	This is a customer consideration.	N/A
329	g. implement device binding to protect the software token from being cloned.	This is a customer consideration.	N/A